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Reid v. Commonwealth
506 S.E.2d 787 (Va. 1998)
L Facts
On December 3, 1997, at a bench trial, James Edward Reid ("Reid")
entered an Alford plea' to capital murder, attempted rape and attempted
robbery in the death of Annie V. Lester ("Lester").2 During the penalty
phase, the judge, sitting as jury, sentenced Reid to death, relying on the
vileness aggravating factor.3 The circumstances surrounding the murder
included twenty-two stab wounds, multiple wounds caused by physical
blows and /or strangulation, the dragging of the body through the victim's
house, partial disrobement of the body, and the ransacking of Lester's
house.4
The decision to enter a guilty plea was predicated on overwhelming
circumstantial evidence of Reid's guilt, including fingerprint and DNA
matches and handwriting samples, all found at the scene of the crime or on
Reid's bloody clothes.' In addition, several witnesses placed Reid at or
around the scene of the crime during the time that Lester was murdered.6
However, no eyewitness testimony of the actual murder was ever presented,
because the only person present at the crime and available to testify, Reid,
was unable to remember any of the events that occurred between arriving
at Lester's house and waking up the next morning with blood on his cloth-
ing.7
1. Reid v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 787,788 n. 1 (Va. 1998). Reid entered anAlford
plea in an effort to avoid a sentence of death. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970) (stating that a defendant has the right to choose to plead guilty in a capital murder trial
in order to attempt to avoid the death penalty, without making a personal admission of guilt).
2. Reid, 506 S.E.2d at 788. The indictment charged more than one offense on one
count, making it duplicitous and invalid. See Payne v. Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 293 (Va.
1999) (stating that every means of committing capital murder constitutes a separate offense).
While pointing ou such an error may lead the government to charge a defendant with
multiple counts of capital murder, this tactic may be utilized to provide additional pre-trial
time for a defense attorney and the defendant.
3. Reid, 506 S.E.2d at 788-89.
4. Id. at 788-90.
5. Id. at 790.
6. Id. Two of Reid's friends dropped Reid off at Lester's house in the morning after
bringing him to a store where he bought a bottle of wine. The empty wine bottle was later
found in Lester's bedroom. Id.
7. Id.
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Reid presented uncontradicted mitigating evidence during the penalty
phase of his capital trial which suggested a low level of culpability due to impair-
ments which led to a black out period encompassing the time in which the
crime transpired!8 Evidence was presented by three medical experts who dis-
cussed Reid's impairments and their effect on Reid's ability to form the requisite
intent necessary to commit the crime.' The three experts also testified to the
nature and quality of the blackout periods that Reid experiences, which result
in a loss of control and a propensity to engage in disorganized, aggressive behav-
ior toward unlikely persons. 10 In addition, Reid presented numerous lay wit-
nesses who supported the expert testimony by chronicling Reid's impairments
and relating episodes of blackouts."
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Reid claimed that the
trial court failed to consider his uncontradicted evidence, including indicia of a
lack of planning, premeditation and memory of the incident, in addition to
evidence of Reid's behavior directly following the murder.' Reid claimed that
this evidence refuted the vileness factor, 3 the aggravating factor relied upon by
the trial court to sentence Reid to death. 4
8. Id. at 790-91.
9. Id. Reid presented evidence of three impairments which, alone or taken together,
provided an explanation, if not an excuse, for his actions in committing the murder. First,
Reid suffered brain damage as a result of head injuries sustained during a 1968 car accident
which left him in a coma or at least five days. The damage occurred to a part of Reid's brain
affecting personality and the ability to control impulses. Second, the head trauma led to the
development of a seizure disorder. Reid's non-compliance in taking medication to control
his condition has led to repeated seizures which have progressively caused more brain
damage. Third, Reid is an alcoholic and binge drinker, with numerous admissions to both
alcohol abuse rehabilitation centers and psychiatric hospitals. Due to his brain injury, Reid
is more vulnerable to the effects of alcohol. As a binge drinker, Reid has not built up a
tolerance to alcohol and thereby becomes intoxicated more quickly than the average drinker.
Id. at 791.
10. Id. at 790-9 1. Dr. Pogos H. Voskanian, a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Stephen Herrick,
a forensic psychologist, and Dr. Randy Thomas, a clinical psychologist, all testified concern-
ing Reid's medical and psychiatric conditions. The experts cited Reid's inability to resist
acting on impulses, his tendency to blackout while intoxicated, and his inability to perform
intentional acts during blackout phases, brought on by his impairments, in providing the
court with the opportunity to find that Reid did not have the requisite intent required to
make him eligible for the death penalty. Id.
11. IaM at 791. Reid's ex-wife, his sister and his mother testified. They all stated that
Reid is a different and violent person when intoxicated. They confirmed that Reid cannot
remember his actions during periods of intoxication. As an example, Reid's ex-wife testified
that Reid stabbed her when he was intoxicated but could remember nothing of the incident
the next day. Id. Counsel should be commended on the impressive case in mitigation,
especially with respect to the extra step taken in providing support of the expert witness
testimony through lay witness, firsthand experience of Reid's impairments.
12. Id. at 789, 791.
13. * See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1998).




The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court did consider Reid's
mitigating evidence when sentencing him to death.15 In addition, the court
conducted its proportionality review and held Reid's sentence to be neither
excessive nor disproportionate. 6
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. The Guilty Plea in a Capital Case
Reid, like many capital defendants, was faced with a difficult choice. The
facts and circumstances surrounding the murder were extremely inflammatory
and the police had videotaped the crime scene in anticipation of trial."7 In
consideration of the overwhelming evidence and its inflammatory nature, Reid
chose to plead guilty and rely on the mercy of the court and his own evidence
in mitigation to avoid the death penalty."
The decision to plead guilty in a capital case is one of the most difficult
choices presented to a criminal defendant and attorney. When considering a
guilty plea, a defendant and counsel must consider which audience would
provide the most favorable disposition upon being presented with the defen-
dant's case in mitigation. In Reid's case, a wealth of mitigating evidence presen-
tation was compiled, including expert witnesses who related the clinical impair-
ments of Reid, and lay witnesses who brought a day-to-day reality of those
impairments to the trier, breathing life into the medical experts' cold, scientific
evidence. Some of this evidence even suggested a defense to capital murder.'
At a full trial, Reid would have been able to begin presentation of mitigation
during the guilt phase, an important step in winning over jurors during a
bifurcated trial, the two parts of which often seem disjointed. Of the possible
parties who will hear a case in mitigation after a plea negotiation has failed, the
jury will often give the most promise for avoiding a sentence of death.
In Reid, the attorney may have been given an indication that the best
route for his client was an Alford plea and reliance on the court.2" If a plea
testimony of Drs. Voskanian, Herrick and Thomas, if true, would cast doubt on Reid's guilt
of capital murder. See supra note 10. This plausible defense strategy appears valid because the
record does not show any finding of intent to kill, or any understanding by Reid that intent
is an element of capital murder in the colloquy surrounding his Alford plea. Reid has raised
this issue in his petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
15. Id at 792.
16. Id at 793.
17. Id. at 789. The videotape was presented into evidence during the guilt phase and
again relied upon in the penalty phase. Id at 789-90.
18. Id at 788, 790-91.
19. See supra note 14.
20. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (stating that a defendant has the
right to choose to plead guilty in a capital murder trial in order to attempt to avoid the death
1999]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
of guilty is being considered in a capital case it is imperative that the defen-
dant be given a formal or strong informal indication from the court that the
sentence will not be death. Absent such indication, a guilty pleas should not
be entered.21
B. Failure to Consider Mitigating Evidence
Reid claimed that the trial court failed to consider mitigating evidence.22
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the trial court did consider
mitigation when it imposed the death sentence23 and then re-characterized
the issue, turning the question into whether the judge had to give controlling
effect to mitigation.24 By twisting the initial claim into an easily refuted one,
the court, citing two prior cases, disposed of Reid's claim.25
C. Reid's Claim that Uncontradicted Evidence Precluded a Vileness Finding
During the penalty phase of Reid's capital trial, Reid provided evidence
suggesting that he did not have the requisite intent necessary to raise the
nature of this crime to the degree necessary to impose the death sentence on
the basis of the vileness aggravating factor.2 This evidence was not chal-
lenged or contradicted by the Commonwealth. In ruling that the trial
court did not err in its finding of the vileness factor, enabling it to impose
a sentence of death, the Supreme Court of Virginia demonstrated again that
the Virginia application of the vileness factor is unconstitutional.
In Godfrey v. Georgia,8 the United States Supreme Court held that the
bare Georgia statutory language providing for the aggravating circumstance
of vileness required for imposition of the death penalty, ("outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind or an aggravated battery to the victim"),29 was unconstitutional absent
penalty, without making a personal admission of guilt).
21. See Matthew K. Mahoney, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 87 (1998) (analyzing Dubois
v. Greene, No. 97-21, 1998 WL 276282 (4th Cir. May 26, 1998)).
22. Reid, 506 S.E.2d at 789.
23. Id. at 792. The trial judge himself cast doubt on the Supreme Court of Virginia's
finding with a 15-minute turn around from the end of the penalty phase to the imposition
of the death penalty. In addition, the trial judge spoke of his duty in terms that suggested a
view that death was to be the sentence if an aggravating factor was proven. Il This, of
course, is not the law in Virginia.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Correll v. Commonwealth, 352 S.E.2d 352 (Va.), cert. denied, 482 U.S.
931 (1987); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 48 (Va.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993)).
26. Id. at 790-91.
27. Id. at 791-92.
28. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
29. Georgia and Virginia have statutorily identical vileness aggravating factors.
[Vol. 11:2
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a narrowing construction given to the jury or applied by the court and
sufficient to show an increased level of individual culpability in the defen-
dant beyond that shown by the commission of the crime.3 Godfrey also
held that the gory nature of the crime scene was constitutionally irrelevant.3
While never formally acknowledging this obligation to narrow, Vir-
ginia courts have employed several definitions of the vileness factor. In
Reid, the trial court relied on aggravated battery, and presumably applied
the Supreme Court of Virginia's definition: "quantitatively and qualitatively
... more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of
murder."32 If Virginia applied the vileness factor by focusing on a quantita-
tively increased level of individual culpability, which would necessarily
include a more blameworthy mental state, such a narrowing construction
would probably be deemed constitutional. But, in Reid the court revealed
the deficient interpretation it has been applying for years: "[w]e have never
held that the 'vileness' factor under Code [sections] 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C)
includes a requirement that a defendant's mental state embrace the intent to
commit an 'outrageously or wantonly vile' murder, and we decline to do so
now."
33
In refusing to consider the mental state of a capital murder defendant
when applying the vileness aggravating factor, the court demonstrated its
flawed application (or worse, ignorance) of the Godfrey requirement.34
Instead, the Supreme Court of Virginia identified its true test for determin-
ing that one defendant's actions are more vile than another's and therefore
worthy of the death penalty. The court stated that number and nature was
the essence of the test.3 ' The court's line of cases illustrate that number is
all that is determinative (counting stab wounds or bullet holes) and nature
merely refers to the weapon of choice (e.g., gun, knife, pipe, etc.).36 A mere
comparison of wounds does not provide sufficient guidance in determining
30. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 432-33.
31. Id. at 433 n.16.
32. Reid, 506 S.E.2d at 793 (emphasis mine) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 248
S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978).
33. Id. at 793.
34. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
35. Reid, 506 S.E.2d at 793. In Boggs v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 407 (Va. 1985) the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that "(t~he number or nature of the batteries inflicted upon
the victim is the essence of the test whether the defendant's conduct was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved.., an aggravated battery." Id. at 421
(internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Reid, 506 S.E.2d at 793. In conducting its proportionality review, the Supreme
Court of Virginia listed other capital cases involving multiple wounds in determining
whether Reid's sentence was appropriate. The court compared the damage inflicted on the
victim by Reid with that inflicted on other victims by their murderers: eleven gunshot
wounds, victim dragged down dirt road; multiple gunshot wounds; thirty-eight stab wounds;
two stab wounds, with blows to head and neck. Id.
1999]
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individual culpability in varying capital murder cases and is therefore
unconstitutional. 7
Reid's claim that the Virginia court's have misapplied a United States
Supreme Court holding' by failing to provide a narrowing construction to
the vileness aggravating factor in Virginia's death penalty statutory scheme
is an old claim, brought before, and rejected numerous times by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.3 ' Nevertheless, this is a meritorious claim that must con-
tinue to be raised and preserved. Reid is raising this claim on certiorari.'
Some day this claim will succeed.
Matthew K. Mahoney
37. In the rare case where there is only one gunshot, the court has recently proven
resourceful enough to uphold the vileness factor anyway. See Kelly E.P. Bennett, Case Note,
11 CAP. DEF. J. 429 (1999) (analyzing Hedrick v. Commonwealth, Nos. 982055,982056,1999
WL 101079 (Va. Feb. 26, 1999)).
38. See Godfrey, 446 U.S. 420. See also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
39. Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Virginia court
utilized appropriate limiting instructions when supplying jury with instructions defining
depravity of mind and aggravated battery).
40. In addition to the related claim regarding mental state necessary for capital murder,
Reid's claim regarding the lack of a narrowing construction in respect to the vileness
aggravating factor would provide the United States Supreme Court with a clean and clear
opportunity to affirm their previous ruling in Godfrey, here disregarded by the Supreme
Court of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit.
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